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When Regulations and Arbitration
Awards Collide: Potential Difficulties
for Arbitrators and Parties
Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. US. Inc.'
INTRODUCTION
Many commercial transactions are complex. The increasing presence of both
arbitration and administrative regulations are part of what creates this complexity. 2
It is thus possible that parties to a commercial transaction will find themselves in
arbitration over a dispute involving regulations. This note will explore the poten-
tial difficulties parties and arbitrators face when arbitration awards and regulations
collide. The difficulties for parties include grounds for vacatur that are either non-
existent or hard to meet, and potentially being forced to choose between violating
a regulation or not complying with the award. Additionally, arbitrators face diffi-
culties in fashioning awards that comply with regulations, especially because early
communications with agencies are usually non-binding.
FACTS AND HOLDING
Four hundred and ten feet of piping in Maine seems insignificant, but it was
sufficient to spark a contentious dispute between two companies in the natural gas
industry.3 H.Q. Energy Services Inc. (HQ), a natural gas supplier, and Bangor Gas
Company (Bangor), a pipeline owner, entered into an agreement for the transpor-
tation of HQ's gas via Bangor's pipeline.4 The crux of the agreement was that
Bangor would build a pipeline (the "Bucksport") that would carry HQ's gas from
an international pipeline (the "Maritimes") to an energy plant nine miles away.
Bangor built a 410 foot pipeline (the "Lateral") to connect the Maritimes to the
Bucksport without HQ's knowledge.6 Bangor initially paid for the costs of the
Lateral's use.7 Six years into the agreement, Bangor discovered that its use of the
Lateral might violate Federal rules.8
1. Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. U.S. Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 183-84 (1st Cir. 2012).
2. 2 Robert L. Haig, N.Y. PRACTICE SERIES - COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE
COURTS § 9:29 (2013).
3. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 183-84.
4. Id. at 183.
5. Id. Bangor would transfer HQ's gas for 15 years in return for a $1,150,662 annual fee, paid in
monthly installments. Id.
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A Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rule requires the shipper
of natural gas to hold title to the gas it was shipping.9 Bangor feared that it could
be deemed to be the "shipper" of the gas going through the Lateral because it
owned the Lateral.10 Since the gas being shipped through the Lateral belonged to
HQ, Bangor feared it could be in violation of the rule.1" To avoid this risk, Bangor
entered into "capacity releases" on the Lateral with HQ.12 Bangor also threatened
to place the capacity rights to the Lateral on the open market if HQ did not pay the
costs of using the Lateral.13 HQ disagreed, believing it shouldn't have to pay addi-
tional costs for the use of the Later, pursuant to the agreement.14
A dispute also arose regarding which party should pay the costs of heating the
gas at the points at which it entered and left the Bucksport.15 Bangor had been
paying the costs at both points up until the dispute arose.' 6 The agreement re-
quired that "irreconcilable disputes" be submitted to arbitration.' 7 Bangor began
the arbitration process in 2010, by submitting several claims.
Bangor argued that HQ should pay the costs associated with the use of the
Lateral, and expenses required to heat the gas at both the Bucksport entry and exit
points. 19 HQ denied that it was obligated to make these payments, and sought
reimbursement for the few Lateral payments it had made.20 The three-person arbi-
tration panel held that Bangor was responsible for the Lateral costs.21 It reasoned
that Bangor's internal documents showed it had factored the costs of the Lateral
into the monthly fee HQ owed, and thus HQ was already paying the Lateral
costs. 22 The panel also designed a payment structure to allow the parties' Agree-
ment to circumvent the FERC regulation: Bangor would release its Lateral capaci-
ty to HQ, and HQ would pay for the Lateral's use.23 Bangor would then reduce
HQ's monthly fee to reflect the costs of the Lateral.24 Finally, the panel required
that Bangor pay the gas heating costs at the point the gas entered the Bucksport,
while HQ would pay the heating costs at the point where it left the Bucksport and
entered the energy plant.25 Under the award, HQ was not required to reimburse
Bangor for the heating costs that Bangor had previously paid, as HQ had inherent-
ly already made these payments in its monthly fee to Bangor.26
9. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 184. "The aim of the rule is to prevent big natural distributors from buying
up pipeline capacity that they do not need for shipment of their own gas and leveraging their market






15. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 184.
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Bangor filed a motion to vacate the award in the United States District Court
for the District of Maine, based on the panel's order that Bangor pay the Lateral
costs, and that HQ need not reimburse Bangor. 27 The district court denied Ban-
gor's motion and granted HQ's cross-motion to confirm the award. 28 Bangor ap-
pealed the district court's decision. On appeal, the United States First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling. 29
Bangor argued on appeal that the vacatur was necessary because the panel
had manifestly disregarded the law in holding Bangor responsible for the costs of
the Lateral. 30 Bangor also argued that the panel's decision to charge each party for
one portion of the heating costs was a compromise, and because the agreement
contained a "no compromise" provision, the panel had manifestly disregarded the
law.31
The First Circuit held that even if the manifest disregard doctrine 32 were val-
id, the panel had not manifestly disregarded the law in holding Bangor responsible
for the costs of the Lateral. 33 Additionally, the panel's solution to ensure the par-
ties were not in violation of the FERC regulation was not in manifest disregard of
the law.34 Lastly, the court held that the panel's award did not violate the agree-
ment's "no compromise" clause, and thus the panel had not acted in manifest dis-
regard of the law in deciding which party would pay to heat the gas upon entry
and exit of the pipeline. 35
LEGAL BACKGROUND
In passing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Congress announced a clear
national policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. 6 The FAA
was enacted to combat rampant judicial disfavor of arbitration agreements, and
requires courts to enforce such agreements whenever possible. 37 The FAA pro-
vides four grounds on which a federal court may vacate an arbitration award.
27. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 186.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 188.
31. Id. at 190.
32. Id. at 187. See also Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330-331 (1st Cir. 2000)
(explaining that in the First Circuit, an arbitrator "manifestly disregards" the law if he recognizes the
applicable law, yet issues an order that disregards it).
33. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 187.
34. Id. at 189.
35. Id. at 191.
36. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
37. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion-- (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
No. 2] 487
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These four grounds are: (1) the award was influenced by corruption or fraud; (2)
partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators refusal to
postpone a hearing when sufficient cause is shown or refusal to hear evidence
relevant and material to the controversy; and (4) where the arbitrators have ex-
ceeded their powers. 39 Courts have long wrestled with the question of whether
these four grounds constitute the exclusive means by which a court may vacate an
award.40
The First Circuit permitted courts to conduct a limited review of arbitration
awards, and vacate under circumstances not contemplated by the four express
grounds for vacatur outlined in Section Ten of the FAA. 41 The First Circuit joined
other circuits, finding that a "manifest disregard for the law" is implicit in a find-
ing that a court "exceeded [its] powers,"4 2 the First Circuit used the term "mani-
,,43fest disregard of the law".
In the First Circuit, the law was considered to have been "manifestly disre-
garded" when the record showed that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law
and then ignored it." An award is also in manifest disregard of the law if it is
contrary to the plain language of the applicable arbitration agreement.45 Prior to
the 2008 case Hall St. Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,46 courts in the First Circuit were
permitted to vacate awards if either of these showings were made. The Supreme
Court's holding in Hall St., however, brought this practice into question.48
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the federal circuits were
divided as to whether parties to an arbitration agreement could expand the grounds
for vacatur of an award, beyond those listed in Section Ten of the FAA.49 In a
footnote, the Court mentioned that the First, Third, Fifth and Sixth circuits had
previously held that parties were able to contract for additional grounds for vaca-
tur, while the Ninth and Tenth circuits had taken the opposite approach.so Circuits
that favored allowing parties to contract for additional grounds for vacatur of an
arbitration agreement reasoned that doing so honored party-autonomy, a major
goal of the FAA.5 1 However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, holding that the grounds for vacatur found in Section Ten of the FAA
were the exclusive means by which a reviewing court could vacate an award.52
In a footnote of its Ramos-Santiago decision, the First Circuit stated in dicta
that Hall Street decision had invalidated the "manifest disregard" ground for vaca-
Id.
39. Id.
40. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitra-
tion Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 763 (1996).
41. Arvest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).
42. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
"manifest disregard" ground is "shorthand" for the "exceeded their powers" ground).
43. McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006).
44. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330-31 (1st Cir. 2000).
45. Id. (citing Advest Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1990)).
46. Hall St. Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
47. Id.
48. Id at 592.
49. Id. at 583.
50. Id.
51. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).
52. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 586.
488 [Vol. 2013
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tur, as it was not among the four grounds expressly enumerated in Section Ten.53
Two years later, the First Circuit clarified that while it had "referred" to whether
"manifest disregard" had survived Hall Street, it had done so in dicta and had
therefore not "squarely" determined whether it was still a viable ground for vaca-
tur. 54 Another two years passed before the First Circuit was again faced with the
validity of the "manifest disregard" standard for vacatur, in Bangor.
There has been a circuit split as to whether the manifest disregard standard
survived the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street; the First Circuit's hesitance
to make a sweeping declaration is not unique.55 The Second Circuit and Ninth
Circuits held that the manifest disregard standard is still a viable ground for vaca-
tur.56 The Sixth Circuit adheres to this approach as well. 7 It held that it would be
"imprudent" to interpret Hall Street as having eliminated "manifest disregard"
because the doctrine was "universally-recognized" prior to the decision. 58 Howev-
er, other courts have come to the opposite conclusion.
One year after the Supreme Court's Hall Street decision, the Fifth Circuit
held that, as a non-statutory ground for vacatur, "manifest disregard" was invalid
after Hall Street.59 District courts throughout the country have come to the same
conclusion. 60 Federal district courts in Texas and Minnesota have reasoned that
since Hall Street limited review of awards to statutory grounds, the judicially-
created "manifest disregard" doctrine is no longer viable.6 1 Despite this circuit
split, the Supreme Court recently declined to consider the issue. 62 In Stolt-Nielsen,
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., the Court stated in a footnote that it had not de-
cided whether its decision in Hall Street did away with the "manifest disregard"
standard. However, "Manifest disregard" is not the only ground for vacatur that
the courts have derived from Section Ten of the FAA.
Some courts have allowed vacatur under the "exceeds their powers" prong of
FAA Section Ten to include vacatur when an award violates public policy.M Like
the "manifest disregard" doctrine, this theory was borrowed is derived from the
common law rule that courts can refuse to enforce illegal contracts. 65 The implicit
"public policy" ground for vacatur is narrow in scope, and courts are hesitant to
invoke it.66 Reliance on this exception requires a showing that the public policy
53. Ramos-Santiago v. U.P.S., 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008).
54. Kashner Davidson Secs. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010).
55. Leigh F. Gill, Manifest Disregard After Hall Street: Back from the Dead - the Surprising Resili-
ence ofa Non-Statutory Groundfor Vacatur, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 265,268 (2011).
56. T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2010); Comedy
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
57. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008).
58. Id.
59. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009).
60. The Householder Group v. Caughran, 756 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Prime Thera-
peutics LLC v. Omnicare Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008).
61. Householder Group, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 800; Prime Therapeutics, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
62. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010).
63. Id.
64. Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. U.S. Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 2012); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987); 1 Jay E. Grenig, ALT.
DisP. RESOL. §24:19 (3d ed. 2013).
65. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 429 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2005).
66. Id.; United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74
F.3d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1995).
No. 2] 489
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allegedly violated is "explicit, well-defined and dominant."67 While expressions of
public policy are generally found in statutes and constitutions, they can also be
found in administrative regulations. 69
Both the California Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have used the public
policy exception to vacate arbitration awards.70 Both cases involved public health
and safety regulations, and both courts stressed that public policy reasons for va-
cating an arbitration award more readily found when such considerations are pre-
sent.
Administrative agencies possess the authority to give administrative guidance
and advice as to the application of the statutes and regulations that they are re-
sponsible for promulgating. 72  Agencies often provide guidance on a particular
statute or regulations due to its complex nature.7 3 However, administrative guid-
ance, whether in written or oral form, is merely instructive, and does not bind the
agency.74 In Bangor, administrative guidance as to the agplication of a Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rule was at issue. 5 The advice was in the
67. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 715 (2d
Cir. 1998).
68. Sandra J. Rosenthal, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.: Clarifying the Public Policy Exception, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 681, 683 ("public policy ... can stem from a federal statute, the Ohio and United
States Constitutions").
69. Id.; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that Coast Guard regulation an expression of public policy).
70. Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 950 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998); Exxon Shipping, 993 F.2d 357.
71. Id.
72. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters:
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 921, 935 (1998). Examples
include "no-action letters" from the Securities and Exchange Commission and "private letter rulings"
from the Internal Revenue Service. Id
73. See supra note 60; Nagy, supra note 71, at 933-934.
Notwithstanding the SEC's efforts to clarify provisions in the federal securities laws through
rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of SEC releases, securities law practitioners constant-
ly struggle to apply statutory provisions and SEC rules to specific securities transac-
tions contemplated by their clients. The Commission has long recognized and appreciated this
struggle. Consequently, from its earliest days, the Commission has encouraged its staff to provide
advice and guidance to those seeking assistance.
Id.
74. The Householder Group v. Caughran, 756 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800 (E.D. Tex. 2008); Prime Thera-
peutics LLC v. Omnicare Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008). Nagy, supra note 72, at 936
("The SEC's procedural rules, for example, describe the availability of 'informal administrative inter-
pretations' and specifically provide that 'opinions expressed by members of the staff do not constitute
an official expression of the Commission's views."').
75. Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. U.S. Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 182 (1st Cir. 2012). "The
rule is not a codified regulation but was announced by FERC in an adjudication of a specific dispute."
Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 37 FERC 61260, 61685 (1986)). See also William Demarest, Gas Mar-
keting by the Operator Under a JOA - Unrecognized Regulatory Risks and Practical Solutions, 64
Okla. L. Rev. 135, 136-38 (2012).
A central requirement of the Commission's open-access transportation program is that all ship-
pers must have title to the gas at the time the gas is tendered to the pipeline or storage transporter
and while it is being transported or held in storage by the transporter. Interstate pipeline tariffs
include provisions requiring shippers to warrant good title to the gas tendered for transportation
on the pipeline. Although specific language of each interstate pipeline's tariff varies, the Com-
mission has made clear that the shipper of record and the owner of the gas must be one and the
same throughout the course of the transportation or duration of storage on any pipeline.
Nat'l Energy & Trade, L.P. Mission Valley Pipeline Co., 134 FERC 61072, 61347 (Jan. 31, 2011).
490 [Vol. 2013
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form of an oral statement by an FERC staff member, and was not binding on the
agency.
INSTANT DECISION
Bangor made clear that, after Hall Street, the First Circuit does not recognize
the "manifest disregard" doctrine as a ground for vacatur.77 This finding alone was
dispositive of the case, as all of Bangor's vacatur arguments were premised on
"manifest disregard."78 Bangor had argued that the arbitrators had manifestly dis-
regarded the law by requiring it to pay the Lateral use costs, and not requiring HQ
to reimburse it for previously paid heating costs.79 The court stated that even if
"manifest disregard" had survived the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street,
Bangor's arguments would still fail.o
Bangor argued that the arbitration panel's decision ordering Bangor to pay for
the costs of the Lateral pipeline were the result of the panel ignoring the law, and
therefore acting with "manifest disregard" of the law. 8' The court responded by
stating that while the plain language of the contract required Bangor to pay this
cost,82 the court found the contract did not mention the Lateral pipeline, and that
Bangor had incorporated the cost of the Lateral pipeline into HQ's monthly fee.83
Requiring HQ to pay for the Lateral would mean HQ was paying for the same
service twice.8 Therefore, the court found the panel had not ignored the plain
language of the contract.85
Bangor also argued that ordering it to pay for the costs of the Lateral violated
FERC's "shipper must have title" rule, and therefore ignored the law. 86 Bangor
argued that this was the case even though the panel had come up with a unique
payment structure specifically to ensure that the award was in compliance with the
FERC regulation." The court acknowledged that agency regulations were "sover-
eign commands" and that an award would be "vulnerable" if it ran afoul of them.88
However, it found the panel's payment mechanism did not ignore the law. 89
First, the court explained the panel had considered the "shipper-must-have-
title" rule at issue when it specifically crafted its award to comply with the regula-
tion.90 The court next stressed that the only communications between the parties
76. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 190 (citing Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 48 FERC 61040, 61203 (July
11, 1989).
77. Id. at 187.
78. Id. at 186.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 187.
81. Id. at 188.






88. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 188.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 189.
No. 2] 491
7
Mitchell: Mitchell: When Regulations and Arbitration
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
and the FERC was through letters between Bangor and FERC. 91 FERC officials
also explicitly said these letters were not binding or definitive. 92 Finally, the court
held the payment structure did not contravene the purpose of the "shipper-must-
have-title rule," which was to ensure that gas companies did not purchase long
stretches of pipeline in order to drive up costs for competitors.93 The FERC regu-
lation did not apply to the Lateral, as it was a small line, the only purpose of
which was to transfer gas from the Maritimes to the Bucksport.94
Bangor's final argument was that the award was in "manifest disregard" of
the law because the panel had ignored the "no compromise" provision of the
agreement.95 Bangor argued that requiring HQ to begin paying the end-of-the-line
heating costs, but not requiring it to reimburse Bangor for the six years Bangor
had paid the costs, constituted a compromise. 96 The court was not persuaded, and
held that who should pay end-of-the-line heating costs from the date of the arbitra-
tion decision, and who should shoulder the previous costs, were separate ques-
tions.97 As such, the court explained that the arbitration panel had not ignored the
law by deciding each question on the merits, even if the individual decisions
didn't benefit the same party.98 The court pointed out that judges regularly sepa-
rate retroactive issues and issues affecting future conduct, and generally have less
"freedom than arbitrators. 99
COMMENT
The arbitration panel that decided the dispute between Bangor and HQ was
responsible for ensuring that its award complied with the FERC's "shippers must
have title" rule. Where arbitrators are required to consider the legality of their
decisions under a complex set of regulations uncertainty and confusion are likely.
This is especially true where the relevant agency has only expressed its position
through a private letter ruling, as was the case in Bangor.
91. Id at 188. Bangor requested a "No-Action Letter" from the FERC, to provide it "assurance"
against an FERC enforcement action. Id FERC's General Counsel denied Bangor's request, but sent
a letter expressing the view that the panel's remedy violated the rule. FERC staff also told Bangor that
the letter was not binding. Id.
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id. at 189.
94. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 189.
95. Id. at 190.
96. Id. at 190-91. The "no compromise" clause in the agreement stated that:
In the event that the arbitration requires a decision (i) as to the allocation or payment of any mon-
etary amounts or valuations to be reduced to monetary amounts, or (ii) the methodology or accu-
racy of any calculation related thereto, the arbitrators shall select the position of that Party which
the arbitrator believes most appropriate under the circumstances. No "compromise" determina-
tion or alternate calculations shall be made by the arbitrator who is bound to adopt the position of
one Party to the exclusion of the other on such matters.
Id.
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Arbitration agreements are increasingly present in the commercial setting.'
Both state and federal administrative regulations are also relevant in commercial
arbitration.1o' Naturally, arbitration awards and agency regulations can coexist, as
they did in Bangor. A fundamental concept of arbitration is that parties to arbitra-
tion are bound by the arbitrator's decision.102 As a result, the collision of regula-
tions and the arbitration process can put arbitrators and the parties in a difficult
position.
If an arbitrator misinterprets a regulation and fashions an award, compliance
with which would require a party to violate a regulation, the party may be liable
for civil penalties.' 0 3 Additionally, failure to comply with an arbitration award
may put a party at risk of further legal action from the adverse party. The solution
to this problem seems clear: an award that forces a party to violate a regulation
cannot possibly be valid. This may be the case, but a party seeking to vacate such
an award may face an uphill battle.
A party bound by an arbitration award that is not in compliance with a rele-
vant regulation can seek to have the award vacated on public policy grounds. This
ground requires the establishment of a dominant, well-defined public policy
through "laws and legal precedents."' As mentioned above, some courts have
read the "exceeds their powers" prong of Section Ten of the FAA as allowing
vacatur when an award violates public policy.'05 An award that violates a regula-
tion would seem to inherently be in violation of public policy.
Violation of an economically-focused regulation, like the one in Bangor,
might not meet this standard. The key is the establishment of a strong public poli-
cy, dominant and fundamental enough to meet the standard. A California Supreme
Court case, Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., illustrates this dilemma.o The
Green court stated that public policy objectives are often are often preserved in
regulations, they are especially found in regulations that promote important legis-
lative objectives and those that protect public health safety.107 The court specifi-
cally found that a Federal Aviation Administration regulation dealing with manu-
100. Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and
Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343, 347 (1995) (stating "the use of commercial
arbitration has begun to accelerate.")
101. Thomas W. Merrill, Toward A Principled Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 31, 35 (1998).
102. Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cit. 1994) ("party is bound by an
arbitral award only where it has agreed to arbitrate").
103. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, Civil Penalty Actions, available at
http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/civil-penalties/civil-penalty-action.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
104. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
105. Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. U.S. Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 2012); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987); I Jay E. Grenig, ALT.
DisP. RESOL. §24:19 (3d ed. 2013); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal
and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.J. 615 (2009) ("the federal courts began using the public policy exception
as an extra-statutory basis for vacatur under the FAA.").
106. See generally Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (1998).
107. Id at 1054-55 (discussing 14 C.F.R. § 21.143, "Quality control data requirements; prime manu-
facturer," the court stated, "[t]he FAA ... used the congressional grant of authority to establish an
intricate regulatory scheme in order to ensure that aircraft design meets safety standards and aircraft
manufactures conform to the design. Regulations require prime manufacturers (such as Boeing) to
establish quality control inspection").
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facturing and inspection requirements of airline parts was a valid source of public
policy, in no small part because it promoted public health and safety.1 08
A similar public policy argument was used in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union, a Third Circuit case that addressed the intersection of arbitration
and regulations.109 In Exxon, an arbitration panel forced Exxon to reinstate a
helmsman who had tested positive for drugs." 0 The award was eventually vacated
as being in violation of public policy. The court found that a Coast Guard regula-
tion prohibiting the operation of a ship by one under the influence of drugs or
alcohol was "well-defined and dominant" public policy."' Like in Green, the
Exxon court stressed that an important public policy was found because of the
safety concerns at play: specifically the potentially "disastrous effects" of a large
oil spill.112
In Green and Exxon, compelling arguments were made that the violation of
the regulations is against public policy, given the potentially grave consequences
of these violations. However, not all regulations lend themselves to such compel-
ling arguments. For example, the purpose of the FERC regulation in Bangor was
to create a competitive marketplace." This is certainly a worthwhile economic
goal, but it does not involve the issues of public health and safety that the courts
cited in Green and Exxon. Parties seeking to rely on the public policy rationale to
vacate an arbitration award because it violates an FERC rule cannot rely on the
fear of tragic airplane crashes or oil spills to motivate vacatur. The public policy
exception is narrow, and courts are hesitant to use it. Thus, to successfully vacate
an award on this ground a party must have a very compelling and persuasive ar-
gument. Without compelling and persuasive public health and safety considera-
tions, arguing that public policy requires the vacatur of an arbitration award, that a
party contracted for, can be a difficult task. What makes this position all the more
unenviable is that if a court does not vacate the award, the party challenging it
may be required to pay civil penalties for violating the relevant regulations.
Section Ten of the FAA does not specifically discuss "public policy" as a jus-
tification for vacatur. Therefore, it is entirely possible that some courts may hold
that the public policy exception is no longer available, after Hall Street.114 Reli-
ance on the "manifest disregard" doctrine is rife with problems as well. "Manifest
disregard" suffers from the same legal uncertainty as reliance on a public policy
argument. As discussed supra, several courts have interpreted Hall Street as inval-
idating the "manifest disregard" doctrine.'"5 Therefore, in some circuits, "manifest
108. Id.
109. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 359. A helmsman is responsible for steering ships, and in this case, ships carrying gas.
111. Id. at 362; 33 C.F.R. § 95.020(b) ("An individual is under the influence of alcohol or a danger-
ous drug when: The individual is operating a vessel other than a recreational vessel and has an alcohol
concentration of .04 percent by weight or more in their blood.").
112. Id. at 367.
113. Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Serv. U.S. Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 190 (1st Cir. 2012).
114. Jonathan A. Marcantel, supra note 105, at 623 (2009) ("While none of the courts discussing Hall
Street Associates have specifically ruled on whether the public policy exception has survived the
opinion, application of basic statutory construction principles indicates the public policy exception has
not survived post-Hall.").
115. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 330-31 (1st Cir. 2000).
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disregard" is not even a valid option. There are also problems in circuits where
manifest disregard is thought to have survived.
"Manifest disregard" is a strict standard, requiring that a party seeking vaca-
tur on this ground shoulder a heavy burden of proof.' 16 For vacatur to be appropri-
ate, the arbitrator must recognize the applicable law and then ignored it." 7 In fact,
courts have held that an arbitrator simply misunderstanding the law, and therefore
misapplying it, does not amount to "manifest disregard" of the law."" This strict
standard for "manifest disregard" may be problematic for parties seeking vacatur.
In Bangor, for example, the court explained that the arbitration panel considered
the FERC "shipper must have title" rule, and believed that the award that it fash-
ioned complied with the regulation." 9 In situations where the arbitor simply mis-
understands the impact of its award on a regulation, and thus causes violation of a
regulation, it seems to follow that "manifest disregard" would not be found. Mis-
understanding of the law, or a regulation, simply does not rise to the level of
"manifest disregard."
The arbitration panel in Bangor had the benefit of a no-action letter from
FERC to help it fashion an award that complied with the relevant FERC regula-
tion.120 Arbitrators with such guidance are in a good position, as they have addi-
tional insight on the relevant regulation. Agency guidance, however, does not bind
an agency. As the Bangor court explained, the FERC may well act differently than
indicated in its no-action letter.' ' Thus, fashioning an award to comply with
agency advice could be an exercise in futility. If an arbitrator relies on agency
advice in making its decision, and the agency later acts contrary to the advice
given in a no-action letter, the arbitrator will have acted reasonably, but still put
the parties bound by the award in a difficult position. If the award violates a regu-
lation, as discussed above, it may be difficult for the parties to have the award
vacated.
Many arbitrators have specialized knowledge and possess expertise specific
fields, such as labor, copyright, or business disputes.122 If a specialized arbitrator
relies on agency guidance that she believes, due to her expertise in a given field,
misinterprets the regulation at issue, the arbitrator is faced with a difficult deci-
sion. She must chose to either rely on the agency's informal, non-binding advice
addressing the specific dispute at issue in structuring an award, or ignore this ad-
vice and fashion an award that she believes is actually incompliance with the rele-
vant regulation. Either way, the arbitrator is put in a difficult position in reconcil-
ing the award with the regulation at issue.
116. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991).
117. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011).
118. Todd Shipyards Corp., 943 F.2d at 1060.
119. Bangor, 695 F.3d at 188.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. L. Vincent Poupard, First Person: The Two Types of Business Arbitrators, Yahoo! Finance (May
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CONCLUSION
Bangor illustrates the potential problems facing arbitrators and parties when
arbitration awards must be fashioned to comply with a complex regulatory
scheme. Parties may be forced to violate regulations in order to comply with an
arbitration award by which they have contractually agreed to be bound. The un-
certainty surrounding the viability of the "public policy" and "manifest disregard"
grounds for vacatur, neither of which is expressly endorsed by Section Ten of the
FAA, creates an initial obstacle for parties seeking to vacate such an award. Fur-
ther, even if both grounds are viable in a given circuit, both require parties seeking
vacatur to surmount a very high standard of proof. Bangor is illustrative of this
situation, as the regulation at issue was economic in nature, and the arbitration
panel fashioned its award with regulation compliance in mind. Finally, arbitrators
may also be in a difficult position of having to predict how an agency may act in
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